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Humphrey Bwire Nagila 
AVOIDING THE DUTCH DISEASE: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
Petroleum is undoubtedly one of the most valuable commodities in the world with 
an annual production worth billions of dollars, and an attempt to relate it to the slow 
economic performance of a country may seem far-fetched. Studies on sub-Saharan 
countries that produce oil have often viewed the country’s ability to govern oil from an 
institutionalist lens. This Thesis aims to explore the governance and management of oil 
resources in African states since this is the focal point between the oil-rich countries and 
the international community. By using a political settlement framework, I seek to further 
the “resource curse” discourse by challenging the new institutionalist theory which fails 
to adequately address the Dutch disease problem. I compare the political settlement 
between Ghana and Kenya and explore the dynamics of power and politics and how this 
relationship shapes the functionality of institutions. My analysis of the current political 
settlement in Kenya that is dynamic in nature, suggests that acceptable levels of elite 
commitment and bureaucratic capability are unlikely to be reached hence making Kenya 
prone to the Dutch Disease.  
                                                                                                       Scott Pegg, Ph. D., Chair  
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Chapter I–Dutch Disease and Economic Performance 
Introduction 
The role political actors play in the governing of a country’s natural resources 
calls for in depth research in order to determine factors that shape natural resource 
governance (Bebbington, 2013).  Several studies have suggested that discoveries of large 
oil wells could slow down the economic performance of a country, a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as Dutch disease and named after the effects of The Netherlands’ 
gas discovery in the North Sea. In this thesis, I examine the immediate effects as well as 
long term consequences of Dutch disease to the economy of a developing country with 
abundant oil resources. Early symptoms of Dutch disease may be characterized in the 
financial markets following a large inflow of foreign currency, due to oil discovery.  
Dutch disease has been described as “sectoral reallocation of economic resources. 
Capital and labor are drawn away from agriculture and manufacturing and they flow into 
the extractive sector” (Pegg, 2009).  Following this finding, it is imperative that 
developing economies which discover large oil deposits and seek to engage in exporting 
such resources, learn from The Netherlands experience which serves as the basis of the 
Dutch disease. Following Michael Roll’s recommendations, this thesis resolves to study 
the political settlement effect in managing oil resources for the following reasons (Roll, 
2011): 
1. It discredits the arguments in new institutionalist theory by advocating 
for an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of politics and power 
relations that define how institutions in a country work.  
2. It illuminates the intertwined relationship between politics and 
economic development.  
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Relationship Between Politics and Institutional Development 
In order to understand the relationship between politics and institutional 
development, awareness of divergent factors that cause different experiences in resource-
rich countries is necessary. For example, in order to understand the probability of Dutch 
disease in Kenya, an in-depth analysis of comparative African politics will be required. I 
have chosen Ghana as a comparison due to its reputation as a leader in democracy and 
good governance in Africa. The assumption being, if Ghana cannot overcome Dutch 
disease, then no country on the continent will be able to. Finally, my choice to conduct a 
comparative analysis between Kenya and Ghana was inspired by the similarities as well 
as the differences between these two countries. For example, Kenya and Ghana pose as 
two economic powerhouses on the eastern and western ends of the continent respectively. 
Both countries boast some of the most advanced institutions and have some of the largest 
middle classes on the continent.  
Given their similarities, comparing Kenya and Ghana from a new institutional 
lens may be counterintuitive, as both countries would be expected to govern their oil at 
almost equal measures; however, the political settlement between the two countries pose 
striking differences that are worth analyzing. While Ghana’s oil started flowing in 2010, 
Kenya just recently commissioned its first batch of 200,000 barrels for refining in 
China.   
This thesis challenges the new institutionalist argument since it fails to address the 
critical role of politics in institutional development. As such, the new institutionalist 
argument fails to discuss factors that influence elite commitment as well as the capability 
of the state to bring about development. (Khan, 2010; Poteete, 2009). To address this 
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better, this thesis uses the political settlements approach which goes beyond good 
governance theory and attempts to explore underlying factors that influence development 
of institutions. According to Di John and Putzel (2009), a political settlement is “the 
balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on 
which any State is based”.  
While several studies that have linked power relations to the development of 
institutions, Khan's (2010) framework for political settlements lays a better foundation in 
explain the role of power relations towards institutional development. (Di John & Putzel, 
2009). Under the political settlements approach, emphasis is placed on inter-elite 
bargains as the key factor in determining the development of institutions. As such, studies 
focusing on natural resource governance that adopted the political settlements framework 
(Hickey, Abdulai, Izama, & Mohan, 2015a; Hickey, Bukenya, Izama, & Kizito, 2015b; 
Poteete, 2009) have provided a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of power 
relations on institutional development, compared to the new institutionalist argument. 
These studies highlight a common theme that forming coalitions help to shape elite 
engagement in the development of institutions that govern natural resources. For 
example, Kenya's pursuit of oil exploration and creating institutions to govern the oil was 
characterized by intensive inter-elite bargaining. This was evidenced in parliamentary 
stalemates that prevented Parliament's passage of the petroleum bill. However, when the 
government eventually received support from the opposition coalition, an amended 
petroleum bill was quickly passed and provided the president the opportunity to launch 
the much-anticipated oil export project of his government. Such inter-elite dynamics call 
for in-depth research and its impact on institutions. Using a political settlement 
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framework, political interests are uncovered, and contributions towards institutional 
choices for natural resource governance are better understood. 
This thesis therefore aims to examine the role of politics and power relations 
between political leaders and elites. I seek to achieve this goal by answering the question 
below. Do political settlements shape elite commitment in the development institutions? I 
examine the political setting in Ghana and compare it to that of Kenya with the aim of 
predicting the capability of Kenya to govern oil under its current circumstances. My 
choice of performing a Ghana-Kenya comparative analysis was informed by the fact that 
both countries are similar in several aspects. For example, both Ghana and Kenya would 
fall under small scale oil producers as compared to countries like Angola and Nigeria. 
Secondly, Ghana is a fairly new player in the oil industry making it a fair comparison to a 
new country seeking to join the oil exporting industry.  The chapters in this thesis are 
organized as follows:  
Chapter I reviews substantial literature on resource curse. This chapter aims to 
explore the role of politics in institutional development (Di John & Putzel, 2009). The 
chapter also discusses more in-depth political arguments that emphasize the relationship 
between natural resources and growth while showing how power relations underlie elite 
interests to institutional development (Poteete, 2009; Khan, 2010). Chapter II explores 
the Dutch disease and its effect to the economy. 
Chapter III of this thesis introduces a conceptual framework based on Khan’s 
framework for political settlements which helps explore the underlying conditions that 
influence elite commitment and shape institutional development. 
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In this chapter, I look at the dynamics of Kenya’s political settlement by exploring 
the transformation of this settlement since independence. This chapter further compares 
Kenya’s dynamic political settlement to that of Ghana which appears to have maintained 
consistency for over two decades. By doing so, I are able to demonstrate how political 
events shape the political culture in a country. I am also able to demonstrate how 
electoral competition and patronage have shaped policy choices over the years and how 
they also help to reveal the changing nature of Kenya's political settlement and its power 
dynamics.  
Chapter IV summarizes the general effect of the resource curse, institutionalism 
and the political settlement framework and provides concluding remarks.  By exploring 
the oil experience in Kenya and Ghana as well as the political settlements both countries, 
this chapter concludes that Kenya’s dynamic political setting possess a challenge to the 
development of quality institutions thus posing a greater risk to the managing of oil.  
New Institutionalists on the Dutch Disease 
 
Following the Dutch disease paradox in the 1960s, several studies have supported 
institutionalism by suggesting that the quality of institutions within a resource rich 
country affects a country’s ability to prevent Dutch disease. When a country becomes 
dependent on its natural resources such as oil, its economic performance tends to slow 
down, thereby slowing down growth. This is particularly common in developing 
countries (Mavrotas, Murshed, & Torres, 2011) that export natural resources making 
them prone to growth failure as well as institutional failure. They allow multinational 
mining companies to take charge of mineral activities in exchange for foreign capital. To 
combat this, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that institutions within a country must be 
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centralized to provide essential services such as education, justice and general 
enforcement of contracts (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  
A study by Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik suggests that institutions are a determinant 
of the resource curse. Their study observes that countries rich in natural resources can 
either experience economic growth or economic loss depending on the quality of their 
institutions (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006). Therefore, if the institutions encourage 
efficient production, the country will experience economic growth. Contrary, if the 
institutions are exploitative in nature, then the country will experience a slow economic 
growth (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006). A centralized institution facilitates innovation 
and leads to economic growth as evidenced during the Industrial Revolution (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012). Under this argument, international agencies have sought measures to 
protect resource-rich countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. One such initiative has 
been the creation of sovereign wealth funds to offset the dangers of Dutch disease and a 
strong oversight role for parliaments and civil society in terms of transparency and 
accountability (NRGI, 2014). However, attempts to establish common patterns of the 
Dutch disease have led to even more contradictory findings. This is because Dutch 
disease manifests in different ways depending on the geographical settings and the 
political settlement (Ross, 2015).  
While it may be difficult to point out a single all-encompassing justification for 
Dutch disease, scholars have made progress toward common explanations for slow 
economic performance among most oil exporting countries. With lack of effective mining 
laws, most oil exporting countries experience loss of revenue, slowed economic 
performance and generally discontented locals. As new players like Kenya seek to join 
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the league of oil exporting countries, the question of whether they will achieve positive 
results using an alternative progressive approach becomes even more important.  
The study by Mavrotas et al. also suggested that developing countries exporting 
natural resources are prone to growth failures as a result of institutional failure (Mavrotas, 
Murshed, & Torres, 2011). In this study, Mavrotas et al. presented a model of growth 
failure with micro-foundations in rent-seeking contests with increasing returns and major 
innovations on their analysis. Their analysis incorporated two main parts - the first being 
the fact it is based on theoretical assumptions and the second, that it is one of the few 
econometric studies into the resource curse that includes analysis over time, as it is a 
panel data estimation. Institutional quality is measured by the degree of democracy and 
the quality of governance, therefore, capturing both the effects of how a country is ruled, 
as well as its polity, with governance having a greater impact on development. To ensure 
more robust results, the authors use a variety of econometric models to test the same 
specification. Their findings suggest that both point-source (those with concentrated and 
capturable revenue patterns such as oil) and diffuse (such as agriculture) natural resource 
dependence deters the development of democracy and good governance, which in turn 
hinders economic growth.  Their study also suggests that point-sourced economies have a 
worse impact on governance, which is more important for growth.  
This study is consistent with a recent World Bank report (Mining & development 
– World Bank, 2002) on the economic performance of mineral exporting countries in the 
1990s. According to this report, countries with medium-sized mining sectors (between 6 
and 15 percent of all exports) witnessed their GDP per capita fall at an average rate of 0.7 
percent a year over the course of a decade. For countries with large mining sectors 
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(between 15 and 50 percent of exports), their GDP per capita fell by an average of 1.1 
percent a year. Finally, countries that have very large mining sectors (over 50 percent of 
exports) saw their GDP per capita fall by 2.3 percent a year (World Bank, 2002). The 
sharp fall in GDP is not only catastrophic to the economy but has also proven to make a 
country prone to civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). 
It is worth noting that some researchers have viewed economic growth spurred by 
natural resources with skepticism. For example, a study by Jean-Philippe C. Stijns 
showed no significant relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth (Stijns, 2005). In this study, Stijns sought to determine the relationship between 
mineral resources and economic growth when one uses actual data about energy, mineral 
reserves and production. Stijns performed an analysis of partial correlations between 
land, as well as fuel and mineral reserves and a number of determinants of economic 
growth. While land is negatively associated with all determinants of economic growth, 
minerals, coal, oil and natural gas are not. He also found that school attendance is 
positively correlated with oil, gas, and mineral reserves. Apart from land, the pattern for 
resource abundance leads to abuse of power through lack of transparency and 
accountability by the government. This is despite the fact that resource abundance is 
often associated with other indicators of the rule of law and bureaucratic performance 
positively. With this complex finding, Stijns suggested a coexistence of both “positive 
and negative channels” through which natural resources affect economic growth. This led 
him to conclude that the ability of a country to exploit its resource base depends heavily 
on the nature of the learning process involved. In their study, Jędrzej Frynas, Geoffrey 
Wood and Timothy Hinks also argue that a country may experience resource curse 
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effects without experiencing actual resource windfalls. As such, expectations of future 
resource revenues can be sufficient to escalate effects of the resource curse (Frynas, wood 
& Hinks, 2017). This study demonstrated negative effects with regards to political 
stability and governance, and significantly greater macroeconomic volatility. Similarly, 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte argue that while a negative correlation between a resource 
variable and institutional quality suggests that resources undermine institutions, absence 
of decent institutions leaves resources as the “default sector” when nobody is willing to 
invest in alternative forms of capital (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008). Other scholars that 
are skeptical of the correlation between natural resources and economic performance 
have not been successful in determining the true cause of the Dutch disease.  
However, countries dependent on mineral exports also tend to exhibit higher 
levels of poverty as evidenced in oil exporting sub-Saharan countries possibly due to lack 
of accountability by the government. As a result, these mineral exporting countries 
become vulnerable to civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). 
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Chapter II–Effects of Dutch Disease on the Economy 
The term “Dutch disease” is a paradox that stems back to the early 1960s in the 
Netherlands. Discovery of natural gas led to increased profitability in the trading sector 
hence causing non-oil exports to become more expensive and less competitive. This 
eventually led to the decline in the growth of the Dutch economy. Since then, the term 
“Dutch disease” has been used to describe a situation whereby a booming tradable sector 
adversely affects the performance of other sectors and eventually slows down the 
performance of an economy. The Dutch disease has been witnessed in many parts of the 
world and although strongly associated with the discovery of a natural resource, it may 
occur in any form of sudden revenue such as foreign direct investment. 
An early study by W.M Corden and J. Peter Neary sought to explain why an 
increase in sudden revenue could be disastrous for an economy. They do this by dividing 
an economy that is experiencing sudden revenue increase into three sectors: the profitable 
export sector, such as the oil industry and the traditional export sector, such as 
manufacturing. These two sectors are considered tradable (Corden & Neary, 1982). The 
third sector would be the domestic retail market which might include areas such as 
construction and would be considered non-tradable. A resource boom can affect the 
economy in two main ways; the resource movement effect and the spending effect. Under 
the resource movement effect, Dutch disease can be triggered in cases of resource 
allocation (Pegg, 2010). As such, when the tradable sector attracts capital and labor from 
the non-tradable sector, there will be contraction of the tradable sector due to its reduced 
use of factors of production. This factor movement will also cause an increased demand 
for non-tradable goods and consequently an increase in price (Stijns, 2003).  
11 
The Spending Effect 
Prices for tradable good are typically determined by producer’s cartel such as the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). When an economy receives 
sudden cash flow from say exporting oil products, income levels also increase as would 
the demand for all goods. If this income is spent on imports, then money supply would be 
balanced and there would be no impact to the domestic retail market. However, the 
outcome would be different if the income received is converted into local currency to be 
spent on the domestic retail market. The key factor determining this outcome is whether 
the value of local currency relative to a major foreign currency (exchange rate) is fixed 
by the central bank or floating. 
Under a fixed exchange rate economy, conversion of the foreign currency into 
local currency leads to increase in the country’s money supply and due to local demand 
domestic prices would go up. As a result, a unit of the foreign currency weakens to the 
local currency (real exchange rate appreciation (Stijns, 2003). On the other hand, if the 
exchange rate is floating, there would be increased supply of foreign currency which 
would also increase the value of the local currency. The real exchange rate appreciation 
in this case however will result from rise in the nominal exchange rate and not rise in the 
domestic prices as with the case of fixed exchange rate. Appreciation for the real 
exchange rate in both cases weaken the competitiveness of a country and shrinks the 
traditional sector in a process referred to as the spending effect. Pegg’s case study on 
Botswana finds that Botswana was successful in avoiding the Dutch disease though a 
solid framework of managing the exchange rate. For example, the government chose to 
keep expenditure growth below the rate of revenue growth (Pegg, 2010). Because mineral 
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revenues can be highly volatile, the government established the Revenue Stabilization 
Fund in 1972 to which would help accumulate reserves (Pegg, 2010). More importantly, 
Botswana realized the possibility of mineral revenues exceeding its absorptive capacity. 
In order to avoid the problem of overheating economy, the government created a Public 
Debt Service Fund in 1972 which enabled it to save the revenue (Pegg, 2010). As the 
economy focuses on profitable exports, there will be an increase in the demand for non-
tradable domestic goods. As a result, resources such as capital and labor shift to the 
production of domestic goods to meet the increasing demand. Both of these transfers 
shrink production in the now lagging traditional export sector. These spending effects 
played out in the oil-rich nations in the 1970s, when oil prices soared, and oil exports rose 
at the expense of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Similarly, higher coffee 
prices in the late 1970s (after frost destroyed Brazil’s coffee crop) triggered a boom in the 
coffee sector in producers like Colombia at the expense of manufacturing (the lagging 
tradable sector), as resources were reallocated to the agricultural (non-tradable) sector. 
Ghana’s Oil Experience 
Ghana serves as the ideal case study as it is widely considered Africa’s model in 
democracy. In 2010, former US president Barack Obama’s choice of Ghana as his first 
African destination while in office further illuminates the idea of Ghana as Africa’s 
beacon. At a glance, peaceful coexistence among communities and democratic process 
such as five consecutive free and fair elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) place 
Ghana above most African countries with regards to good governance (Moss & Young, 
2009).  
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A report by the World Bank shows that in 2017, Ghana’s economy doubled its 
growth rate from 2016, earning it the second fastest growing economy in Africa. 
(“Ghana's 2018 Economic Outlook” ,2018). Ghana is among the newer oil exporting 
countries and exports about 120,000 barrels of oil per day (Kopiński et al., 2013). 
Hydrocarbon reserves in Ghana were first discovered over two decades ago with the 
establishment of the Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC). However, several 
attempts by the GNPC to explore oil in these reserves showed little success therefore 
forcing GNPC to seek partnership from international partners. This led to the discovery 
of the Jubilee Field (deep water oil and gas reserves) in 2007 by Kosmos Energy, a small 
American exploration company, 60 km offshore. Coincidentally, Ghana was celebrating 
50 years of independence from British colonialism, hence the name Jubilee Oil Fields. 
This discovery was met high expectations such as better infrastructure by the Ghanaian 
people and the belief that Ghana would transition from third world status to becoming a 
middle-income country (Gary, 2009; Breisinger et al., 2009). However, like most third 
world countries, the majority of Ghanaians live below the poverty line with lack of access 
to clean water, sanitation and electricity (“Ghana: The Waste Land”, 2010). 
Prior to discovering the Jubilee Field in 2007, Ghana was only producing about 
600 barrels per day through the salt pond fields (Manteaw, 2010). However, with 
commitment and determination to engage in large scale oil exploration, the government 
initiated the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2006 (“Ghana: Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper”, 2009). The aim of this strategy was to boost the economy by focusing on 
five key areas. This included, focus on the agricultural and service industries through 
better infrastructure as well as good governance. With these government initiatives, 
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Ghana became more attractive to foreign investors and more exploration licenses were 
granted to international oil companies.  
In the case of developing countries that specialize in exporting oil, such as Ghana, 
a common explanation accepted by scholars is the path of development adopted. Nigeria, 
for example, adopted a path which focuses on large scale offshore drilling and exporting 
of crude oil and importing refined oil as a finished product. This became the main 
economic activity, and the country became entirely dependent on revenues from 
exporting crude oil (Odularu, 2008). Total commitment to this strategy, however, has 
failed to reach desired levels of economic performance in Nigeria. The next part of this 
thesis will examine major factors that slow down economic performance of oil exporting 
economies, and in the process, develop a case for Ghana’s course. With global increase in 
demand for petroleum, increased oil mining activities have been evidenced, particularly 
in developing countries. Many of these countries are promised economic growth in 
exchange for opening up their oil wells to multinational corporations (MNCs). These 
MNCs also benefit from a wide range of incentives such as tax breaks and security.  
Ironically, while accommodating free trade by allowing these corporations to 
mine the oil, most developing countries continue to receive insignificant revenue 
sufficient to facilitate economic growth. To better analyze this paradox, Peter G. Warr 
observes a relationship whereby investment incentives offered to multinational 
corporations are not proportional to the level of economic development that was 
anticipated. By focusing on Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, Warr studies the relationship between Export Processing Zones (EPZS) and 
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the host country’s economic policies. Warr refers to this relationship as “Resource 
Enclaves” (Warr, 1989).   
Similarly, Ackah-Baidoo observes that most of oil production in oil rich Sub-
Saharan Africa takes place in enclave-type environments offshore where pockets often 
boom in isolation and offer no incentives to the general public (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012). 
Nigeria’s continuous conflict in the Niger Delta region, while producing oil in large scale 
provides a good example of how isolated large-scale oil enclaves can be. Ghana appears 
to have taken a different path with a visibly slow structural transformation. This may 
possibly be attributed to Ghana’s slowness in detaching itself from the ideologies of the 
socialist dictator, Kwame Nkrumah, or simply lack of technical knowhow in the oil 
industry. Oil exploration in Ghana can be traced back to the 1800s. During this time, the 
colonial administration in the region was confident about future large-scale discoveries in 
the future. It was however not until 1966 that the then-administration contracted a 
Romanian company to drill a well in the eastern part of Ghana along the Keta Basin. The 
vast majority of developing countries that export oil is featured at the bottom of the UN 
Human Development Index and are increasingly dependent almost entirely on oil 
revenues. Reluctance to follow the lead of large-scale oil producers such as Nigeria, 
Sudan and Angola may have helped Ghana shield itself from factors that promote Dutch 
disease. 
The theory of “Rentier State” coined by economist Hossein Mahdavy, supports 
the Dutch disease by demonstrating its impact on the economic performance of a country. 
Yates further builds on the Rentier State Theory by arguing that a slow economic 
performance of a developing country is a result of its dependence on revenues from 
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exporting oil. It refutes the idea that such countries only experience boom-and-bust 
cycles of resource dependency, but rather argues that resource dependency is a result of 
poor management. The Rentier State fails to establish proper mechanisms to manage 
natural resources resulting in lack of accountability and an inflated economy. The fallacy, 
however, is the more Rentier States spend unearned revenue in an attempt to develop, the 
further away they become from actual development. According to Yates, "The decline 
and fall of oil-rentier states will be the unintended consequence of their regimes living off 
unearned oil revenues, instead of attending to the genuine developmental needs of their 
domestic populations" (Yates, 1970). 
Ricardo Soares de Oliveira is not pessimistic in the same ways as Yates. Instead, 
he proposes the term “successful failed states” to highlight the paradoxical nature of the 
eight oil-rich countries surrounding the Gulf of Guinea. These “petro-states” that hold a 
tenth of the world’s oil reserves, are viewed internationally as stable and are able to 
negotiate effectively with oil companies, but are failing to provide necessities, like health 
care and education, to their citizenry. This poor quality of governance leads Soares de 
Oliveira to posit that the region will likely not shift to a governance model that 
encourages accountability from its leaders and elites. That is not to say that the states will 
fail - Soares de Oliveira predicts their continued economic stability into the future due to 
the assurances that oil provides despite mismanagement, risk, and other domestic barriers 
(Soares de Oliveira, 2007). Other counter arguments against Yates’ theory suggests that 
the gap between developed and developing countries is directly proportional to their 
ability to accumulate capital since the margin of savings is directly proportional to the 
increased productivity (Singer, 1950). However, while democratic institutions and 
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policies are necessary, they are not sufficient in avoiding the curse. For example, a 
summary report published by economist Sébastien C. Dessus suggests that the slow 
structural transformation in Ghana may be an indication that Ghana may already be 
experiencing symptoms of Dutch disease (Dessus, 2011). Low levels of oil production 
may negatively impact Ghana’s economy since increase in demand of oil will further 
increase the price of goods and services. As a result, Ghana’s export competitiveness will 
be impacted. 
In the early 1990s Ghana experienced a “mining boom”. However, with a 
shortage of skilled labor as well as appreciation of the (Ghanaian currency) cede, 
manufacturing became less competitive. Consequently, both Ghana’s manufacturing 
output and GDP declined by about 3 percent over the past decade (Nayda et al., 2015). 
While Ghana may have succeeded in avoiding an oil mining economy built on financial 
injections from China as well as multinational corporations, the question of whether or 
not it will avoid the Dutch disease remains. Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus and 
Wojciech Tycholiz study attempts to explore this question by asserting that the discovery 
of oil in Ghana has enabled it to strengthen its ‘immune system’ by adopting a legal 
framework. As such, Ghana has witnessed significant improvements in matters of 
transparency and accountability (Kopiński et al., 2013). 
Kenya’s Oil Experience 
Recently, Kenya has reportedly discovered significant amounts of oil wells in the 
northern part of the country. For the residents, discovery of oil brings expectations and 
renewed hope for better living, as well as an end to poverty. However, with such high 
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expectations, Kenya will need to adopt a long-term strategy of managing this precious 
resource and avoid turning this blessing into a curse that dims the hopes of residents. 
Oil in Kenya was first discovered during the pre-independence era by the white 
settlers. During this time much of the drilling was done within the coastal region but 
wasn’t very productive as the wells only exhibited traces of oil. With 16 wells drilled 
between 1960 and 1984 (KCSPOG, 2014), the government resolved to establishing the 
National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) which would be responsible for advancing 
the search for oil in Kenya. As a step towards strengthen NOCK, the government enacted 
laws that to facilitate oil exploration in Kenya. The first law, Exploration and production 
Act, was enacted in 1984 and sought to govern the oil industry (KCSPOG, 2014). This 
Act was amended in 1986 to include Production Sharing Contract (PSC) which enabled 
government to contract drilling and production of oil.  As a result, 14 additional wells had 
been drilled by 1992 but showed no significant deposits of oil (KCSPOG, 2014).  
During this period, the government continued investing heavily on oil exploration 
and research with the intent of discovering hydrocarbon basins. For example, the Lamu 
basin study that was completed in 1994 suggested the possibility of significant oil 
deposits although not significantly commercial (KCSPOG, 2014: NOCK, n.d). However, 
oil deposits were discovered in parts of Turkana County (Patey 2014, 8) by Shell 
Company but political unrests hampered exploration activities and the well was left 
undeveloped. This also made Kenya unattractive to contractors seeking to explore oil as 
onshore drilling in Uganda and offshore drilling in Mozambique proved more lucrative 
(KCSPOG, 2014). In 2012, Tullow Oil Company found significant oil deposits in the 
south Lokichar basin which is in Turkana County (Tullow, n.d.). This discovery was seen 
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a major breakthrough in Kenya’s oil industry and as a result, about 40 wells were drilled 
by 2016 (KPMG 2016, 5). President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government has prioritized 
creating measures that will enable Kenya to capitalize on the oil discoveries before the 
end of his term in 2022. For example, the government had initially planned on 
constructing a pipeline from Uganda to the port in Mombasa to allow export of oil by sea. 
However, this plan failed to kick off after failed talks between Kenyan officials and their 
Ugandan counterparts who opted for a pipeline through Tanzania’s port of Tanga 
(Senelwa, 2016). In response, the Kenyan government announced that it would construct 
a local pipeline to run from South Lokichar Basin area in Turkana to the port in Lamu 
covering a distance of about 865 kilometers (Senelwa, 2016; Ndege, 2017).  
With this pipeline, Tullow predicts that up to 100,000 barrels of oil per day could 
be transported Tullow (n.d.), The government’s push to expedite oil exports led President 
Kenyatta, in 2016, to announce that small-scale exports would begin in June 2017. By 
March 2017, the government had already signed a production contract with Tullow Oil 
providing for the security and transportation of crude from south Lokichar to the port of 
Mombasa for export (Otuki, 2017). 
The Early Oil Pilot Scheme (EOPS) aims to facilitate economic, physical and 
logistical development of future oil resources (DPU, n.d.). This program is one of the 
flagship programs of Uhuru Kenyatta. The EOPS produces approximately 2000 barrels 
per day from the current upstream petroleum wells and storage tanks (Tullow, n.d.). This 
scheme is not intended to provide important technical and market information to help 
fully develop the sector (DPU, n.d.). Tullow has plans to evacuate its stored crude 
(Tullow, 2017), despite initial delays in awarding the EOPS upstream contracts. President 
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Kenyatta's efforts to speed up crude oil export timelines seemed to have gained ground, 
since in May 2017 with China and India committing to purchase crude oil from Kenya 
(Ndege, 2017). However, a day before the ESOP program was rolled out the government 
announced its plans to suspend the project. This government action is suspected to have 
been caused by a lag in implementing the oil bill (Githae, 2017; Letting & Kamau, 2018). 
Media reports have also indicated that tensions in Turkana prevent Tullow's access to its 
sites, and that the main Kitale-Turkana road was being blocked by bandit attacks 
(Achuka, 2017; Githae, 2017). Finally, a statement expressed by the Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum (2017): "It is clear that the Government of National Government and the 
County Government of Turkana need more debate before the first oil is transported to 
Mombasa” also explains why the EOPS was suspended. After extensive talks with the 
leaders of Turkana regarding the issue of the revenue-sharing, consensus was eventually 
reached in May 2018 (Kamau, 2018). On 3 June 2018, Uhuru Kenyatta initiated EOPS 
and finally began the movement of crude oil by road to Mombasa (Tullow, n.d.).  
The EOPS project has raised several questions regarding government’s capability 
to monitor the project. One of the main concerns related to the project is the 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) which the law requires should be 
carried out before a project starts. Tullow Oil on the other hand failed to disclose how 
EOPS started before ESIA was completed (Makore, 2018). However, the website of 
Tullow confirms that ESIA was to launch in the second quarter of 2018. Just one month 
after the start of the EOPS, communities along the Lokichar-Kapenguria road who were 
protesting blocked the road and causing the EOPS to be suspended for several weeks. 
Some of the locals’ concerns were unemployment among other benefits which prompted 
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the government to set up the Turkana Grievance Management Committee, to resolve all 
issues surrounding the EOPS (Makore, 2017). The government obviously rushed to get 
oil rentals and overlooks certain important aspects. The decision to quickly set up EOPS 
may have been informed by the ruling coalition’s goal of winning the next general 
elections. This is in line with Khan who argues that the need to win elections provides 
incentives that determine the likely timeline and its capacity of implementation (Khan 
2010, 67-68). Given the competitive political clientelist system in Kenya, the excluded 
horizontal factions are strong thus explaining the short-term strategy of the Jubilee 
administration. The government’s interest is to demonstrate success in the production of 
oil and as a result gain more votes for the next elections. 
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Chapter III–Political Settlements and Institutional Development 
Political settlements are characterized by an agreement reached between elites 
with the aim of minimizing violence as well as the winner takes it all nature of conflict. 
Essentially, countries engaging in political settlements tend to easily shift from autocratic 
and move towards a democratic mode of governance.  In order to maintain power, the 
ruling coalition suppresses or co-opts with the opposition. Therefore, this kind of political 
settlement provides very little hope of changing power through a formal electoral 
process. Other scholars (Kurtz, 2009) have also argued that under such settlements, 
economic growth is stalled when non-elites are “excluded from effective political 
participation.” An alternative settlement, competitive clientelism manifests when power 
changes through formal electoral process.  
Although each type of political settlement shapes the structure of governance, 
power relations manifested under political settings are dynamic. This implies therefore 
that the roles played by coalitions are crucial in determining which path will be taken. For 
example, Leftwich and Khan argued that the manner in which ‘deals’ are struck is likely 
determined by the type of settlement in accordance to the structural balance of power 
(Leftwich & Khan,2010). Therefore, ruling coalitions may be interested in encouraging 
political elites to invest in the long-term task of building institutions. 
New institutionalists such as Acemoglu and Robinson, and North, Wallis, and 
Weingast have illuminated the critical role politics play in the implementation of 
institutions. For example, North et al. explore this topic from a historical institutional 
perspective using the theory of “limited access orders” (LAO) and their transition to 
“Open Access Orders” (OAO) (North, Wallis, & Weingast,2009). Under this approach, 
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they argue that power relations in suppressing violence and the implementation of 
institutions. North et al. suggest in their analysis of OAO that a ruling coalition can 
exploit its economy in order to create stability as a solution to violence (North, Wallis, & 
Weingast, 2009, p. 13). In their LAO analysis, the ruling coalition restricts the opposition 
coalition access to valuable natural resources such oil as well as rent seeking activities 
(North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). According to North et al., if power relations 
characterized by patronage and the use of force does not lead to effective established 
institutions that improve governance, they are likely to result in violence. This political 
dynamic has inspired analysts to adopt the “political settlement” approach in 
demonstrating the role of power relations and elite commitment in the governance of 
natural resources (Di John & Putzel, 2009; Poteete, 2009). 
While Khan’s primary focus is elite incentives and their influence in shaping 
institutions with the aim of controlling natural resource, he explores further the role of 
politics in shaping the governance of natural resources. For Khan, the political settlement 
approach provides a better explanation of how institutions are created based on the 
distribution of resources by the ruling coalition (Khan 2010, 4). Works in Africa 
(Guichaoua, 2012; Poteete, 2009; Ovadia, 2016) and Latin America (Bebbington, 2012, 
Thorp et al., 2012) on the role of elite contestations and elite interests in defining the 
direction and shape of natural resource governance are consistent with Khan’s. The 
LAO’s framework is different from Khan’s political settlement approach. The former 
places emphasis on how power relations dictate the formation of more competitive and 
efficient forms of democratic governance focusing on how institutions grow and function 
over time (Hickey, 2013). Khan (2010) on the other hand, is keen on the balance of 
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power between competing groups as fundamental to understanding elite commitment 
with regard to institutional choices. Concerning clientelist political settlements, Khan 
emphasizes the role of power relations and patronage politics as key in shaping elite, 
institutional processes and outcomes. Therefore, in comparison, the political settlements 
approach offers a stronger framework than LAO’s in explaining the role of power 
relations in institutional development.  
In order to understand the impact of political settlements institution development, 
it is important to analyze elite commitment in natural resource governance (Hickey, 
2013). This context helps to demonstrate how specific actors and their interests help 
shape the process of developing an institution. For example, Poteete’s study focused on 
the impact of political settlements in shaping elite commitment to institution development 
in Botswana (Poteete, 2009). 
Poteet argues that Botswana’s success story can be attributed to a stable ruling 
coalition who distributed rent-seeking opportunities to elites that were committed to 
progressive policies and likely to resist violence. Her study demonstrates how inter elite 
competition is vital in the commitment of political coalitions to develop institutions and 
provide good governance to natural resources (Brinkerhoff, 2000; 1999). According to 
Khan, competition for rents usually results in situations that negotiated institutional 
arrangements within political coalitions are developed and implemented because ruling 
elites envisage that their interests of staying in power will best be served upon 
ratification. The Structure of the Ruling Coalition and Elite Commitment to Resource 
governance as well as the organization of power within the ruling coalition is important 
in shaping elite commitment to resource governance (Khan, 2010).  
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The criteria used to distribute power also dictates how deals and bargains will be 
struck. Distribution of power can either be horizontal (elites outside the ruling coalition) 
or vertical which refers to power of various factions within the ruling coalition (Khan, 
2010). According to Khan, “these relational dynamics are important for understanding 
the likely horizon of the ruling coalition and its capacity for implementation” (Khan 
2010, 64). As such, a weak horizontal power creates a sense of security to the ruling 
coalition who will then seek to make long term decisions. Therefore, the ruling 
coalition’s interests play a key role in shaping levels of elite commitment to institutional 
development (Hickey et al., 2015a). However, strong opposition from the excluded 
coalitions can diminish the long-term decisions made by the ruling coalition, forcing 
them to adopt short term interests in order to secure power.  
Khan also notes that the ruling coalition plays a key role in ensuring that power of 
factions within is consolidated. This helps the ruling coalition implement its mandate 
effectively (Khan, 2010). However, Hickey et al. caution about the dangers of having 
stronger factions within the ruling coalition (Hickey et al., 2015a; Hickey et al., 2015b; 
Asante, 2016; Abdulai, 2017). When this happens, ruling coalition capability to enforce is 
diminished as the ruling elites turn their focus to contain policy resistance by strong 
lower level factions. This kind of elite interaction is particularly evidenced among 
emerging resource-rich countries (Hickey et al., 2015a; Hickey et al., 2015b; Asante, 
2016; Abdulai, 2017). Under clientelist settlements ruling elites can either oppress or 
assimilate powerful groups when building their coalitions. Such bargaining will also play 
a key role in shaping elite commitment toward institutional development. Under 
competitive clientelist settings, electoral turnovers are likely to occur and as such, 
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politicians are forced to discretionarily allocate rents and provide preferential access to 
natural resources in order to retain power (Levy 2014, 40). For Example, Hickey et al. 
study the case of Uganda’s and Ghana’s oil deals.  
The fact that Uganda has a dominant party enabled it to secure a better deal as it 
was able to repress opposition coalition. Consequently, politicians were able to engage in 
long term decisions toward institution development. However, due to competitive 
clientelist settlement, Ghana’s bargain capacity was undermined by the politicization of 
the issue resulting in a lower deal (Hickey et al.2015a, 28). This study illuminates a 
previously mentioned idea that elite commitment to institutional development is heavily 
influenced by the nature of coalitions, as well as the manner in which deals are struck 
(Bebbington, 2013; Thorp et al., 2012). Timing of when to exploit resource revenue is 
also critical. According to political scientist Benjamin Smith, ruling coalition that are oil 
based, tend to last longer than is often assumed. Smith contrasted two oil-rich states, Iran 
and Indonesia, during the 1960s and 1970s. In this study it was observed that while the 
shah of Iran fell ignominiously in 1979, Indonesia's president, Suharto, lasted nearly two 
decades longer (Smith, 2007). President Suharto’s durability may be resulting from a 
broad-based supporting coalition that is crucial in surviving political crises. On the other 
hand, the Shah of Iran’s fall may be as a result of overdependence of oil-based patronage 
from the beginning because it is an easier course (Smith, 2007). 
Political Coalitions and Elite Commitment to Oil Governance 
Khan’s approach of political settlement illuminates the competition between elites 
to develop policies that support good governance of oil in Kenya. As argued before 
(Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012) inter elite competition as well as the ruling coalition 
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have a strong influence on the level of political will to govern the oil. This idea enables 
us to identify incentives at the national level that shape policy commitments since 
according to Khan, ruling elites seek to establish stability as access to oil determines how 
groups cooperate or fight the coalition in power (Khan, 2010). Khan’s argument also 
illustrates how coalitions are formed by striking deals that form the basis for institutional 
development. The power relations discussed here is important in understanding the 
interests of political elites as they campaign for national participation in oil governance 
and seek to distribute rents and patronage networks (Di John & Putzel, 2009). Elite 
commitments are characterized by ever changing interests and therefore studying inter 
elite bargain helps understand these interests and how they lead to institution 
development (Brinkerhoff, 2000; Watts, 2012; Bebbington, 2013).  These elites are 
political actors or state bureaucrats who have the authority to allocate and distribute 
resources as well as those with authority to negotiate on behalf of others such as civil 
society groups (Di John and Putzel, 2009).  
When it comes to natural resource governance, Poteete argues that elites 
must include all stakeholders such as civil societies in their decision making (Poteete, 
2009). Brinkerhoff’s framework is particularly important in demonstrating how elite 
commitment shape institutional development (Routley, 2012). Applying this framework 
to Kenya’s political settlement, I can predict that that oil governance in Kenya will be 
based on the short-term interests of the ruling coalition. Given the nature of power 
relations (Booth et al., 2014; Khan, 2010), political elites may have incentives to secure 
oil rents and ensure that their authority is maintained. As such, governance of oil in 
Kenya will be in a manner that appease different groups that hold power. Kenya’s patron-
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client characteristic also indicates that the ruling coalition could offer economic and 
social gains to the general public in order to gain electoral favors (Khan, 2010).  
Ghana’s Political Settlement 
Unlike Kenya, Ghana’s political settlement is characterized by two political 
parties which appear to be highly stable. Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus and Wojciech 
Tycholiz attribute Ghana’s success to the country's stable political system, a robust and 
diversified economy, and a strong civil society (Kopiński et al., 2013). After a series of 
political instability in the 1970s, the National Defense Council (NDC), under the 
leadership of Jerry Rawlings, redefined Ghana’s political settlement by facilitating 
competitive clientelism following the return of multi-party politics in 1992 (Oduro et al., 
2014). During this period, Ghana’s political settlement was characterized by two main 
political parties; NDC and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) under the leadership of Adu 
Boahen. These political parties, just like the case in Kenya have been affected by 
ethnicity. For example, the NPP has at times been associated with the Ashanti tribe while 
NDC has been associated with the Ewe and the north. Rawlings, an Ewe by tribe, is on 
record referring to Ewe region as his stronghold on Election Day (Nugent, 2001). 
Although ethnicity has been evidenced within these parties, cabinet appointments under 
the NDC administration has been inclusive to other ethnic communities. For example, 
John Atta Mills, an Akan from the Fante tribe, was handpicked NDC presidential 
candidate to succeed Rawlings. NPP also demonstrated cross ethnic inclusivity after the 
2000 election by appointing a Muslim as a vice-president for the first time in Ghana’s 
history. Just like Kenya, inter party factions have been controlled by powerful politicians. 
In the mid-1990s, the NPP was divided into two camps; one led by Adu Boahen and the 
29 
other led by John Kufuor. While the two politicians both hail from the Akan 
communities, they receive nationwide support within the NPP party. As a result, John 
Kufuor secured the 2008 presidency though support from delegates that represented areas 
that did not traditionally support the party. Ghana’s political settlement as presented in 
this case illuminates the fact that ethnicity plays a less significant role in Ghana’s politics 
as compared to individual leadership. This is in contrast to Kenya’s political setting 
where individual leaders and ethnic background have equal influence. Party politics in 
Ghana is also based on ideology rather than ethnicity. For instance, the NPP since 
inception has always advocated for the free market. While in opposition, the NPP has 
pushed for tax reforms and growth of the middle class. When in power, they have 
consistently focused on property ownership. This policy has often been criticized by the 
NDC as one that facilitates social marginalization. The NDC on the other hand has 
branded itself as an advocate for social democracy. With such ideologies, inter-
party competition has been characterized by adherence to democratic rules and as a 
result, both the NPP and NDC have consistently respected election outcomes for the past 
two decades. Successive peaceful turnovers have seen Ghana praised as a beacon of 
democracy in Africa (Radelet, 2010). Party governance have also witnessed several 
candidates from within contesting for leadership positions and unlike Kenya, such 
contests have often ended on a conciliatory note between winners and losers. It is often 
tradition in Kenya for candidates who lost in such contests to either appeal against the 
decision or leave the party altogether for a new one. Under Ghana’s political settlement, 
elite bargaining process is intense, and members adhere to the established rules in 
exchange for political power. This level of democracy combined with issue based party 
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agenda and economic policy-making have contributed towards establishing successful 
economic growth.  
However, Ghana’s political settlement has been criticized by some for failing to 
address critical issues such as structural transformation, socio-economic equality and 
institution-building (Oduro et al., 2014). Others (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012; 
Keefer, 2007) have argued that even under a multi-party system, Ghana has failed to 
eliminate clientelistic politics. With only two major political parties, elections are 
typically tightly contested and tend to frequently change from one party to another. Such 
high electoral turnovers force the ruling party to politicize public bureaucracy and 
personalize policy-making and elections. As a result, the country experiences significant 
employment turnover, with critical institutions such as the finance ministry struggling to 
maintain autonomy especially around election period. Public funds also tend to be spent 
in huge amounts thereby undermining economic growth (Killick, 2008). 
Ideological differences between the NDC and the NPP however have shaped oil 
governance in Ghana. The NDC generally focuses on the stake for the state with regards 
to oil contracts while the NPP viewed foreign investment as key in developing the oil 
mining sector. 
These differences in governance and the extent of autonomy between Ghana’s 
national oil company and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) 
demonstrate how key institutions have been shaped by successive regimes. Some studies 
have focused on understanding the role of party politics and the political Economy of 
Ghana’s oil (Mohan, et. al., 2018). More particularly, this study focuses on the limited 
impact of oil exploitation in Ghana despite the country’s strong democratic values and 
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internationally recognized oil governance legislation. The study concludes that the 
general inter elite competition undermines Ghana’s potential to maximize its benefits on 
oil exploration (Mohan, et. al., 2018) 
Kenya’s Political Settlement 
This section discusses the essence of the Kenyan political settlement from 
independence to the present day. This provides a historical account of inter-elite 
relationships of power that form the basis for institutional and political choices in Kenya. 
In other terms, this section discusses the various factors that contribute to Kenya's current 
dynamic political settlement and patterns that thus make political power essential in 
influencing political engagement in policy choice.  
While Ghana seems to enjoy competitive clientelism, Kenya appears to have 
maintained a dominant settlement that stems from the colonial period and based on 
regional and ethnic lines (Widner, 1992). Prior to gaining independence, there was 
political competition that led to bargains and compromises among ethnic elites that 
represent different regions of the country. After independence, these elites 
institutionalized themselves by controlling economic activities and political processes in 
their respective regions. For instance, elites under KADU party that was led by former 
president Moi controlled the political and economic activities of the Coastal, Western and 
Rift Valley regions. To date, their families have continued to dominate the political scene 
within these regions and even at the national level. Although modern day politics in 
Kenya has led to some families losing political influence, they continue to have economic 
influence though resources they acquired with the support of the post-colonial 
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government. For example, with vast areas of land, such elites are able to control the 
economic process within their regions and beyond. 
The central and parts of the eastern provinces of the country were under the 
control of KANU party and although Luo Nyanza was initially part of KANU, a bitter 
fallout between President Jomo Kenyatta and Vice President Jaramogi Oginga split the 
party into two different regional along ethnic lines. Jaramogi eventually resigned from 
KANU and established an opposition party KAU. As such both President Kenyatta and 
Jaramogi continued to lead their elites in consolidating their political interests in their 
respective regions. Today, their families continue to dominate Kenya's politics at the 
national level as evidenced in the 2017 general elections that was bitterly contested by 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, sons of Kenyatta and Odinga respectively.  The post-
independence political settlement in Kenya involved elite bargains along ethnic lines 
where deals were struck with the aim of enabling individuals to acquire political power 
and remain influential within their region. This settlement continues to dominate the 
current political setting and shape Kenya’s institutions. Despite, acquiring a new 
constitution in 2010, elites continue to use ethnicity in order to preserve the factors for 
political bargains that shaped independence politics. Consequently, the institutions in 
Kenya are often characterized as semi - autonomous and excessively weakened. For 
example, after each general election, the elites that lose elections have always questioned 
the credibility of the elections body; Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission 
(IEBC) and often pushed for the firing of the election commissioners. They will typically 
justify their protests using a famous slogan “watu wetu”, Swahili for our people, to 
suggest that a particular region/ethnicity has been marginalized. The elites that were in 
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conflict during the independence period used the same slogan to push for their agenda. 
Unfortunately, the successors of these elites have remained in conflict as the battle to 
maintain power. The stability of institutions in Kenya is based on who among the elites is 
included in the instruments of power.   
Kenya from 1964 to 1978 
After independence, the British colony left Kenya under a federal constitution 
with a highly structured multi-party system that included cooperation between central 
government and local authorities. This system was known as the Majimbo and was 
opposed by Kenya’s first black president Jomo Kenyatta. He appeared to have favored a 
democratic single party system and a unitary state where the supreme authority was the 
leader (Oyugi, 1992). And this approach has influenced Kenya’s political settlement to 
date. Kenyatta exploited clientelism to establish a one-party state through a pseudo 
parliamentary, multi-party system, by awarding promotions to public positions and state 
resources from those willing to switch to the Kenya National Union (KANU) (Barkan, 
1994). Kenyatta's change ultimately culminated in Kenya's African Democratic Union 
(KADU) breakup, when the group entered Kanu in 1964 and its members named to the 
cabinet. It was also around the same period that white settlers who were worried about 
the future of the country had fled and sold their properties. The government helped the 
new KANU and KADU leaders to acquire large parcels of land in settlers or in the White 
Mountains.  
Another way of ensuring exclusive market access to the elites was by use of state 
machinery. Trade control were masked by campaigns of Africanization, which included 
the promulgation of the 1967 import, export and essential supplies Act (Bedasso, 2015). 
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This is the basis of modern Kenya's patronage politics (Wanyama & McCord, 2017) 
where a single party can divide the nation along ethnic and political lines for patronage 
reasons. Kenyatta rejected institutional control via the party in order to maintain Personal 
Control (Kanyinga, 1995) shortly after these divisions. He formalized clientelism as an 
instrument for Kenyans engaging in political processes. The state and the citizens were 
connected by a hierarchy of customer networks, which Kenyatta led and as a result, 
mechanisms of political power and growth were extracted from a network of lower 
ranking elites (Barkan, 1984).  
With the introduction of the concept of "constituency operation," Kenyatta 
legitimized the patronage system and encouraged members of parliament to initiate self-
help initiatives in the constituency as a way of "practical" politics. The interest of 
lawmakers was in turn measured by their ability to attract development resources to the 
electorates (Okumu & Holmquist, 1984). At the same time, the President urged people to 
ask local politicians for development projects. This process indicated that it was 
imperative for lawmakers to commit to political infrastructural projects in order to 
succeed in both local and national elections. By channeling state resources via networks 
of elites, only politicians with State patrons could win elections (Wanyama & McCord, 
2017). This first era of dynamic clientelism was marked by the involvement of many 
parties vying for power and influence around the leader; who in turn contained them by 
creating political stability (Wanyama & McCord, 2017). In the 1970s, Kenyatta 
transitioned into authoritarian clientelism, which implied that a strong governing 
coalition followed the leader and ensured that his orders were complied with. This also 
meant that different parties’ consumer practices were accepted as long as Kenyatta's 
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dominance was not threatened (Barkan, 1992). Kenyatta attracted, supported and inspired 
politicians who wanted to develop political mileage instead of undermining it. His aim 
was to consolidate political authority by choosing and maintaining patronage tools. He 
also changed alliances with various clientelists for political advantage while at the same 
time escaping some form of dissent (Wanyama & Okumu, 2017). During this period, 
Kenyatta’s Kikuyu community produced majority of elites that benefited from his regime 
(Booth et al., 2014).  
Kenya from 1978 to 2018 
After succession of President Kenyatta by his vice president Daniel Moi in 1978, 
Kenya witnessed a transition to authoritarian settlement. Under the Moi regime, state 
resources were openly transferred from privileged groups to form the power base of the 
Kenyatta regime. This was done by manipulating all of the country's political spaces and 
repressing all of the Kenyatta regime networks. As a result, politicians from the rift valley 
region specifically the Kalenjin community were elevated to the center of economic and 
political power. Elites, particularly in the Kenyan Asian community, were customary in 
securing public contracts with elites in the Moi coalition (Booth et al., 2014). 
Consequently, centralization, authoritarianism and a deterioration of national institutions 
increased. An attempted coup in 1982 led to the evolution of a totalitarian government 
(Wanyama & McCord, 2017). The patronage networks and state equipment that 
connected Moi directly to the local level also increased. In contrast, the sovereignty of 
other political power centers was drastically reduced. This meant centralization of state 
apparatus and constant interference with civil society groups in order to reduce their 
influence on local politics. For example, local NGOs were deregistered or coopted 
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(Kanyinga, 1995). The dominant client coalition of Moi ensured that his authority was 
revered by all means. When the multi-party-political system was introduced in 1992, 
there was little impact on the political settlement because the ruling coalition was too 
powerful for the weak opposition party groups in the periphery (Wanyama & Okumu, 
2017). KANU, president Moi’s party, lost its election in 2002 to a united opposition 
coalition, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This came as a testimony to Khan’s 
assertion that 'authoritarianism is usually overcome by weaker marginalized parties' 
(Khan 2010, 6).  
President Mwai Kibaki's endorsement through a memorandum of understanding 
provides a perfect scenario on how an alliance is created. NARC was formed from 2002-
2018, after exempted political parties discovered that their fracturing played an important 
part in their electoral failure in 1992 and 1997 general elections. To address this problem, 
14 political parties, two powers, and a dissident KANU party merged to form a grand 
coalition, NARC. The binding agreement of the Party was that, if achieved, government 
positions would be allocated to the coalition's leading players and Kenya’s Constitution 
would be amended with the aim of achieving economic growth and good governance 
(Anyang-Nyongo, 2007). A government under Kibaki signaled a change from repressive 
to cooperative clientelist ruling coalition. This consists of governing coalitions 
characterized by political entrepreneurs ' leadership who bring together enough groups to 
attain power at the lowest cost (Khan, 2010).  
As a leader of an alliance, the control of Kibaki was not as consolidated as its 
predecessors. He was also relatively liberal with regards to governance, which allowed 
senior government officials to do their job independently. Kibaki has also been credited 
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for opening up the political domain for public discussion. However, like his predecessors, 
his regime was marked by corruption in key sectors. A blend of ethnicity and patronage 
was the basis for the recruitment of officials to fill high-ranking public posts (Masime & 
Kibara, 2003). Under Kibaki’s cabinet ministers serving in more powerful dockets such 
as finance and security came from the same region as the president (Booth et al., 2014). 
Also under Kibaki’s regime, the country’s election body was compromised through 
clientelism. One of the most important steps Kenya has ever made is perhaps the 
constitutional review process, which was meant to weaken the presidency through the 
transfer of power (Anyang–Nyongo, 2007; Wanyama & Okumu, 2017). Kibaki’s 
shortcomings were attributed to the growing strength of the ruling coalition's lower 
factions, making it hard for the president to fulfill his commitments.  
In view of the pyramid structure of customers ' organizations, the stronger the 
lower factions, the more challenging it is to implement certain rules. Implementation 
requires greater collective action and the distribution of rents to many or all lower-class 
groups to ensure their cooperation (Khan 2010, 65). It is for the same reason that bribery 
in the Kibaki government was rampant. Booth et al. attribute this to Kibaki's decision to 
turn east as donors from the west were critical of his approach to fighting corruption 
(Booth et al., 2014). Although there were internal conflicts with his coalition, there was 
little resistance from within. This aspect encouraged Kibaki to concentrate on long-term 
planning and growth projects (Khan 2010, 65). In his first term, all economic sectors 
expanded. He embraced a liberalized economic approach that enabled people to take part 
in economic activities without any significant restrictions.  
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The state has also initiated major infrastructure projects such as new highways 
and reconstruction of old ones (Booth et al., 2014). The second term of Kibaki began in 
2007 after a heavily contested presidential election. Although Kenya's economy had 
strengthened during his first term in office, Kikuyu political leaders from within his 
community felt excluded. Criticisms have arisen regarding alleged regional development 
imbalances and disparities (Booth et al., 2014). This provided the basis for the bloody 
violence that followed the contested election outcome in 2007. The NARC governing 
coalition eventually fell apart and was replaced by new alliances. The post-election unrest 
in 2007 came to an end following intervention by the international community. The 
National unity coalition (PNU) mediated a power sharing deal between Raila Odinga's 
faction, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Kibaki's new party. As such, the 
constitution was amended to allow Kibaki and Raila serve in a coalition government as 
president and prime minister respectively. However, this did little to change the status of 
the cooperative political settlement of clientelists.  
Even after the promulgation of the new Constitution in 2010 that allowed more 
checks and balances to the government, President Kibaki was still dominant (Booth et al., 
2014). Rent-seeking was nonetheless relevant on both sides of the coalition government 
and with the discovery of oil in the North of Kenya most politicians rushed to purchase 
blocks of land within that region (Booth et al., 2014). The coalition government lasted 
from 2008 to 2013, after which new elections saw the Jubilee government come to 
power.  
The triumphant Jubilee government was an alliance of two major political parties, 
which comprised two ethnopolitical groups: Kikuyu and the Kalenjin tribes. President 
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Kenyatta; Kikuyu heading the National Alliance Party (TNA) and Deputy President 
William Ruto, a Kalenjin supporting the United Republican Party (URP). There are, 
however, 11 factions in all in this alliance (Booth et al., 2014). The International Criminal 
Court concluded and charged both members for instigating tribal conflict in the 2008 
post-election crisis, but the charges were eventually withdrawn (Booth et al., 2014). 
Uhuru Kenyatta perpetuated the patronage system as he took power. In view of the new 
Constitution's requisite that the Cabinet be chosen from members outside parliament, 
members and ethnic groups close the President and his deputy were considered for 
various government positions. Those selected are loyalists, just like their predecessors 
(Booth et al., 2014, p. 21). As predicted, corruption case became rampant under this 
regime due to the intensified rental competition under the patronage system. In the 
cabinet of the President there have been numerous cases of alleged corruption since 2013. 
For example, in 2015, the Petroleum and Power minister and three other cabinet 
secretaries were suspended for alleged corruption (Nalubega, 2015).  
There have also been other major scandals concerning close allies like the 
National Youth Scandal, in which the Minister for National Devolution was linked to the 
loss of over USD 7.5 million (Kenya Today, 2015). The Deputy President has on 
numerous occasions been painted as the face of corruption in Kenya (Brunton, 2018). In 
fact, community leasing seems to be gaining some leverage since it is an important 
feature of Kenya's governance (Brunton, 2018; Topguy360 Kenya, 2018). In August 
2017, general elections were also characterized by civil unrest and tensions. The 
opposition leader who was also the main rival of Uhuru declared that the state had 
manipulated the polls and sued the government at the Supreme Court for breach of the 
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constitutional requirements of the technical processes (BBC, 2017). Interestingly, the 
courts ruled on behalf of the opposition and directed a reelection within 60 days. 
However, days before the fresh elections, Raila declared he had withdrawn because of 
grave concerns over the electoral body. Following these reversal, new elections were 
conducted, and Uhuru Kenyatta was declared president for the second term. Raila 
delegitimized Uhuru's presidency by inciting violence and even self-declaring the 
people’s President. This led to civil unrest within the country (Burke, 2018).  
Following Khan's framework to political negotiations, the President reached an 
unofficial agreement with the opposition leader that was referred to as the handshake 
arrangement to contain the opposition and create stability (Onyulo, 2018; AFP, 2018). 
These handshake talks were private between the president and the opposition leader 
therefore leaving no record of the deal that was struck. Several speculations have been 
made about the handshake with some claiming that the shake of hands was not intended 
to end hostilities between the two sides, but to exchange the goods of government 
(Warah, 2018). The polls in Kenya are key illustrations of the vote definition in stable 
political settlements as explained by Khan.  
According to Khan, elections are a platform to measure the institutional forces of 
rival coalitions (Khan 2010, 68). Therefore, elections are effective when institutional 
power on the ground reflects and the opposing coalitions have a tacit rule of law that lets 
losers embrace outcomes without confrontation. According to this view, the 2017 polls in 
Kenya were ineffective because the rule of law was not observed and therefore created a 
temporary period of anarchy.  Nevertheless, with the "handshake agreement," the ruling 
coalition managed to regain unity in the short term. The "handshake agreement" has 
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significantly undermined the factions within the ruling coalition by including the main 
opposition party in the governance. With a weakened and divided opposition, I predict a 
change from competitive clientelism to a dominant party. Some of the predominant 
characteristics of the dynamic clientelist structure in Kenya include absolute presidential 
power, strong vote rivalry and politics of patronage. The next section addresses these 
features in detail. My goal is to highlight the manner in which company policy affects 
political decision-making which helps pave the way for the analysis of important factors 
influencing the Kenya oil governance. 
Ethnic Competition 
Since the general elections in 2003, elections in Kenya have become highly 
competitive. This is consistent with Khan's claim that elections provide a platform for 
evaluating political strength among opposition coalitions (Khan 2010, 68). Inevitably, 
losing parties are prevented from participating in decision making with regards to 
governance (Bedasso, 2015; Mueller, 2011). Ethnicity also plays a crucial role. For 
example, if the loser has enough resources to challenge the winner, the country can easily 
fall into anarchy, as evidenced in Kenya. On three occasions, Raila Odinga disputed the 
legitimacy of the polls citing strong reasons. With the ruling coalition's holding power 
(significant support from the excluded ethnic communities) and ability to contain 
conflict, it continues to strike deals that promote political stability (Khan, 2010).  
The opposition is always, however, a threat and the ruling coalition appears to be 
weak in its strength, which is affected by political spending to win elections (Mueller, 
2011). An important feature of Kenya's political competitiveness is the difference in 
resource allocation for ‘partisan strongholds’ with the goal of increasing electoral 
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support. Since independence, ethnic voting and partisanship have been exacerbated by a 
patronage policy that contributes to the unequal allocation of resources to areas with high 
electoral support. It appears to be a buyoff for current voter loyalties and a political 
support arrangement (Booth et al., 2014; Wanyama & McCord, 2017). Mueller claims 
that ethnicity is a central determinant of Kenya's national capital distribution (Mueller, 
2011). Politics (in Kenya) is by and large viewed as a winner-take-all race with a goal of 
gaining access to the national economic resources.  
Although the Constitution of Kenya includes specific provisions aimed at 
promoting equality through allocation of public resources and political appointment of all 
42 ethnic communities, the country continues to struggle with ethnic marginalization. 
According to Mueller ethnic bloc voting is a threat to Kenya's multi-party democracy, as 
was witnessed in the post-election violence, and unfortunately the citizens appear to have 
accepted this as a way of life. As mentioned above, electoral rivalry and coalition-
building were exacerbated and sustained by clientelist politics. The Kenyan constitutional 
requirement to mandate the five-year term also enforces the need for political survival 
and therefore push politicians to meet their supporters ' short-term demands (Mueller, 
2011). Pressure from the voters can shape politicians’ commitment to service delivery 
who have the goal of reelection (Bratton, Bhavnani, & Chen, 2012; Whitfield, 2011).  
The ongoing political tension may be helpful to explain the link between 
institutions and allocation of public resources. Under the current competitive clientistic 
relationship, two dominant political parties built along ethnic lines maintain their power 
through the distribution of socio-economic rewards to their supporters (Bedasso, 2015; 
Booth et al., 2014). As such, political parties have been converted into the platforms 
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whereby elite supporters are rewarded by offering top government positions after 
winning elections (Bedasso, 2015; Booth et al., 2014; Topguy360 Kenya, 2018). The 
downside of such an approach is while the ruling coalition neglects public office 
appointments using a merit-based criterion, qualified personnel are left out therefore 
contributing to brain drain and poor economic performance (Booth et al., 2014). As 
previously mentioned, the competitive nature of elections in Kenya provide politicians 
the opportunity to concentrate on broad-based growth. For example, most Kenyans 
believe that Kibaki's shared government as a result of the 2007 disputed elections 
presidency played a key role in developing the financial and political sector (Booth et al., 
2014).  
The current Jubilee administration has also carried out ambitious projects in the 
fields of education and nutrition (Booth et al., 2014). However, corruption continues to 
plague the country. Patronage based system was present in Kenya before independence 
(Bedasso, 2015) and prevailed as the preferred method of governance until 2003. 
However, over the past decade, market for lease across sponsorship networks has become 
increasingly attractive. With the discovery of oil, such patterns are expected to intensify 
(Booth et al., 2014, p. 33). Kenya's democratic governance initiatives continue to focus 
on patronage-led politics and influencing the dynamics of wealth distribution and 
government expenditures to facilitate political short-term gains (Bedasso, 2015).  
With a relatively new constitution, there has been improved checks and balances 
of the government, more liberal economy, and protection of civil society groups as well 
as the media.  As a result, the country has achieved a stable political settlement which 
enables clientelists to engage in heavy electoral competition and political patronage. 
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Ultimately, the systemic complexity of Kenya's dynamic clientele’s government 
approach poses a challenge to the productivity and execution of initiatives, as it aims to 
pursue short-to medium-term targets in growth essential industries (Whitfield, 2011; 
Whitfield, Therkildsen, Buur & Kjær, 2015). Important decision-making bodies like the 
senate are therefore poor mainly due to the presidential hegemony (presidency) which 
favors the latter. The patron-client dynamic is repeated as leaders try to expand and retain 
their coalitions to secure power as well as maintain status quo (Mueller, 2011). 
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Chapter IV–Conclusion 
This thesis highlights the importance of good governance in fostering economic 
development and more importantly in managing a country’s oil reserve. The ability of 
institutions to facilitate good economic performance is highly dependent on the political 
settlement of a country and the ideas shared by elites that shape the functionality of 
institutions. 
By shifting the focus from the institution lens of good governance to the role of 
political settlements, I are able to examine how ruling coalitions and regimes affect the 
governance of natural resources such as oil. Ghana’s competitive clientelistic political 
settlement appears to have established stability in the country. However, the country still 
struggles with economic growth. I focus on the important role that political elites play in 
the good governance of natural resources, and how power relations among elites shape 
the development of institutions. 
As discussed in this thesis, the quality of these institutions is directly influenced 
by the political settlement of a country which establishes the incentives and ideas that 
shape the behavior of elites. From the institutional lens perspective, Ghana in West 
Africa appears to lead toward success in avoiding the Dutch disease through adoption of 
a more progressive approach. The Ghanaian government has established rules and 
regulations governing the oil industry yet despite these regulations, Ghana continues to 
experience slow economic performance. A study (Adams et.al., 2019) on Ghana’s 
economic performance indicated that Ghana’s membership of Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and policies set up to manage petroleum are insufficient to 
avert the resource curse. Their study recommends that institutional factors such as the 
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quality of institutions, quality and effectiveness of government, and accountability must 
also be reinforced.  
Until these factors are effectively detected and addressed, an outcome indicating 
Dutch disease may be inevitable (Adams et. al., 2019). The study advocates for deeper 
understanding of the intertwined macro-level factors that lead to the Dutch disease. 
Similarly, I find little evidence that good governance reforms based on transparency and 
accountability is effective in helping a country avoid Dutch disease. Kenya's challenge to 
manage its oil cannot be solved by the new institutional framework of good governance 
(EPWG, 2018; KCSPOG, 2018). The 'good institution' framework fails to sufficiently 
cover the Dutch disease as well as provide measures to prevent its occurrence. By 
looking at difference case studies I find it necessary to advance research beyond the 'good 
governance' framework and examine other factors that may contribute to the Dutch 
disease such as how political settlements shape the development of institutions 
(Ayanoore, 2017).  
As discussed in this thesis, Kenya's competitive political settlement has been 
critical in the development of institutions through building of coalitions and striking 
deals. I use Khan's political settlements framework, particularly with regards to the 
distribution of power between political elites to determine how inter elite relations 
influence the governance of oil in Kenya. For example, the establishment of legislation to 
protect the oil industry demonstrates an intense inter-elite bargain and deal making within 
Kenya's political settlement that is characterized by elite opportunities to create political 
loyalty through rental distribution. This oil governance and legislative processes is 
consistent with Khan's proposal that institutional development originates from the power 
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distribution within a political settlement. In countries with competitive clientelist settings 
such as Kenya, winning elections is so important that politicians adopt policy initiatives 
which enable them allocate resources to powerful factions that either challenge or help 
sustain their power.  
The dynamics of the political settlement in Kenya are also very important in 
managing their relationships with the elites because politicians gather votes to win 
elections. The new institutionalism argument is that institutional efficiency is the key to 
preventing "the Dutch disease (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013) such governance debates 
go further to explain changes in resource management across resource-rich countries. 
Recent institutional theories tend to focus on institutions rather than the dynamics of 
power relations behind them. My findings highlight weaknesses in the effectiveness of 
the good institutions argument in explaining the relationship between oil and economic 
performance (Poteete, 2009; Hickey et al., 2015a; Hickey et al., 2015b). The main short 
coming of the good institution argument is that it fails to demonstrate how effective 
institutions that help resource rich countries prevent the Dutch disease are established in 
the first place. It appears that the question of how institutions are developed can better be 
addressed by exploring the dynamics of inter elite power relations. 
The government’s strategy to co-opt coalitions could be a major factor in avoiding 
the Dutch disease however, concerned about the government’s capacity to govern oil 
have been raised. These include the government’s decision to ignore environmental 
factors as well as engaging local communities. Khan argues that states with centralized 
institutions do not work as they should in competitive clientelist system (Khan, 2010). 
While this study did not go extend to evaluate the quality of institutions, I concur with 
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Karl (2007) that politics plays a critical role in shaping the kind of institution likely to 
govern Kenya's oil industry. This framework creates a good background to improve 
substantive research within the field of the natural resource governance (Hickey et al., 
2015a; Hickey et al., 2015b). While I agree that it is important to study the factors 
impeding institutional growth, understanding elites’ behavior in institutional development 
is imperative. 
With regards to the resource curse, attempts by the government to coopt the 
opposing coalitions demonstrates a significant step towards avoiding the curse. This is 
consistent with Poteete’s argument which attributes Botswana's success to politicians 
who created stable coalitions by distributing rent-seeking opportunities to elites who were 
likely to oppose policies that would lead to developmental outcomes, as opposed to 
achieving the same through violent means (Poteete, 2009). 
While this thesis did not go beyond to assess the quality of the institution, I find 
that that politics plays a very important role in shaping the development of an institution 
intended to govern Kenya’s oil industry. However, while the political settlement 
approach has helped point out major weaknesses in the good governance argument, it 
does not demonstrate how elite’ interests shape institutional development.  For example, 
in Kenya’s case, the government may have been informed by the thought that the local 
government does not have the ability to manage large sums of revenue which could 
potentially lead to the Dutch disease. I therefore contend that analysis regarding natural 
resource governance can only be useful if the elite interests are factored, which this thesis 
has not achieved.  
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In this thesis, I conclude that the development of quality institutions occurs under 
a consistent political settlement. While Ghana continues to struggle with economic 
challenges, its consistent political settlement has been crucial in the development of 
quality institution as well as strong legislation to govern its oil. This is in contrast to 
Kenya’s dynamic system which suggests difficulty in developing quality institutions to 
govern its oil. I therefore recommend to Kenya to adopt a consistent political settlement 
that will enable politicians create long term policies which will be fundamental in 
developing quality institutions. Using this as a starting point, further studies on countries 
with similar political settlements as that of Kenya can be done with the aim of identifying 
how they can transform rent-seeking behaviors into productive growth. The adoption of 
this approach within the context of natural resource governance has created knowledge 
for strengthening significant arguments of the political settlement framework.  
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